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Abstract 
 
The relationship between legal standards of proof and thresholds of statistical 
significance is a well-known and studied phenomena in the academic literature.  
Moreover, the distinction between the two has been recognized in law.  For example, in 
Matrix v. Siracusano, the Court unanimously rejected the petitioner’s argument that the 
issue of materiality in a securities class action can be defined by the presence or absence 
of a statistically significant effect.  However, in other contexts, thresholds based on fixed 
significance levels imported from academic settings continue to be used as a legal 
standard of proof.  Our positive analysis demonstrates how a choice of either a statistical 
significance threshold or a legal standard of proof represent alternative and often 
inconsistent attempts to balance error costs, and that thresholds based on fixed 
significance levels generally are not consistent with existing or optimal legal standards of 
proof.  We also show how the statistical testing and legal standards of proof can be 
reconciled by replacing fixed significance level hypothesis testing with likelihood ratio 
tests. 
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I. Introduction 
 
A primary issue for courts faced with evaluating statistical evidence offered by 
experts in litigation is how to draw legal inferences from statistical results.  One approach 
taken by some courts is to use the standard tools of statistical inference to make legal 
inferences.  For example, in a discrimination dispute, the existence of a significant 
statistical disparity among workers in hiring and salaries, after accounting for other 
factors, has been used to determine whether the plaintiff has met their burden of 
production for a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination.1   Similarly, courts  
use evidence of statistically significant abnormal returns at the time of a corrective 
disclosure to determine the existence or absence of price impact in class action securities 
litigation.2 
 
The principal question addressed in this paper is when and under what circumstances 
is the use of standard tools of statistical inference consistent with the applicable legal 
standard of proof that applies to the case.3  Economists, statisticians, and judges import 
from research settings fixed significance levels—usually 5%, but sometimes 1% or 
10%—and use them to make legal inferences.4  When a research standard such as the 5% 
significance level is used to make legal inferences, is the resulting decision consistent 
with satisfaction of a legal standard of proof such as “more likely than not?”  Moreover, 
if levels of statistical significance used in the research context do not generate results that 
																																																								
1 See, e.g,,  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) where a showing a statistically 
significant difference is prima facie evidence of “disparate impact” under U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i).  
2 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 573 U.S. _ (2014) 
(Halliburton II) (defendant may present evidence of non-significant abnormal returns at class 
certification stage to show the lack of price impact). See also Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach, and 
Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation (February 
12, 2017). Texas Law Review, 2018, Forthcoming; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 328/2016; U 
of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 16-16, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817090; 
Alon Brav & J. B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: Low Power, Confounding 
Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 583 (2015). 
3 The process of fixed significance level null hypothesis testing is described in detail in Section II, 
below.  See also Stephen T. Ziliak & Deirdre N. McCloskey, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES (2008) 
(documenting the arbitrary nature of the standard fixed significance level test, and criticizing its 
use generally, including uses in academics, science, and law). 
4 See for example, James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS, _ ed. 
(2011) at 77-8 (“In many cases, statisticians and econometricians use a 5% significance level.”); 
Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS, _ ed. (2002) at 124 (“Suppose we have 
decided on a 5% significance level, as this is the most popular choice. See also Zilliak & 
McCloskey, supra note 3 (discussing the history of significance tests). 
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are consistent with the applicable legal standard of proof, is there another fixed 
significance level that does generate such consistent results?5 
 
The short answer to both prior questions is no.  While both legal standards of proof 
and statistical significance levels can be characterized as normative choices made to 
minimize the sum of error costs and direct costs, there is no a priori fixed level of 
statistical significance that will generally coincide with the applicable legal standard of 
proof.  Moreover, it is generally not possible to simply replace one fixed level of 
statistical significance with other fixed levels of significance to make the statistical test 
coincide with the applicable legal standard of proof. That is, even though one can express 
the applicable legal standard of proof in such a way that it can be understood in fixed-
significance level terms in each case, the level of statistical significance necessary to 
achieve this result varies across cases and circumstances. Thus, there is no one level of 
statistical significance that generally corresponds to the legal standard of proof in a 
context-free way. 
 
Others have pointed out the divergence between statistical and legal standards of 
proof.  Indeed, there is a large literature examining the distinction between legal 
standards of proof and statistical significance thresholds.6  Moreover, the distinction 
																																																								
5 Some courts have considered experts’ use of alternative fixed significance levels.  See In Re: 
High-Tech Employee Antirust Litigation, Case No. 11-CV-025009-LHK, Order Re: Defendant’s 
Motions Regarding Dr. Leamer and Defendant’s Joint Motion for Summary Judgment Based on 
Motion to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Leamer, (2014) at 22, fn. 25. In that case, the plaintiffs’ 
expert argued that a 50% significance level “suggests that it is more likely than not that the 
compensation of employees were decreased during the period of the agreements.” The court in In 
Re Photochromic Lens Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No.  2173 (04/03/14), also considered 
statistical evidence offered by plaintiffs that did not meet the “conventional 5% significance 
level.” Plaintiffs argued that a significance level of 50% would “avoid false negatives, or what 
statisticians refer to as ‘Type 2 errors.’” (id. at 48). The court in Photochromic did not accept the 
defendants’ arguments regarding the impropriety of using a higher fixed significance level, noting 
that “Although his studies test the boundaries of reliable evidence permitted under Daubert, as 
well as the Supreme Court’s directive in Comcast that statistical models prove with precision 
impact and damages on a classwide basis, I cannot agree that Dr. Singer’s use of a 50% measure 
of statistical significance, by itself, is sufficient justification for denying class certification.” 
6 See, e.g., Michael O. Finkelstein and Bruce Levin, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS, 2d. Ed. (2001); 
Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L. J. 
773 (2009) (analyzing differences between EEOC 80 percent rule and statistical significance); 
Marcel C. Garaud, Legal Standards and Statistical Proof in Title VII Litigation: In Search of a 
Coherent Disparate Impact Model, 139 U. PENN. L. REV. 455 (1990) (discussing the distinction 
between legal and statistical significance); Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of 
Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N. Y. U. L. REV. 385 (1985) (using error cost 
analysis to determine appropriate level of confidence in civil litigation); Allan G. King, “Gross 
Statistical Disparities” as Evidence of a Pattern and Practice of Discrimination: Statistical 
versus Legal Significance,  22 THE  LABOR  LAWYER  271 (2007), Richard O. Lempert, The 
Significance of Statistical Significance: Two Authors Restate An Incontrovertible Caution. Why A 
Book? 14 L. & SOC. INQ. 225 (2009). 
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between statistical significance thresholds and legal standards of proof has been explicitly 
recognized by the courts.  For example, in Matrixx v. Siracusano,7 the Court unanimously 
rejected the petitioner/defendant’s argument that equated the materiality standard in a 
securities fraud case with evidence of “statistically significant” adverse effect of its 
product on the rate of anosmia (the loss of smell).8  Courts also have criticized the use of 
fixed significance thresholds in antitrust cases.9  However, in other contexts, courts 
continue to use standard fixed-significance level hypothesis testing as a legal standard of 
proof.  For example, in disparate impact discrimination cases, courts continue to use fixed 
significance level thresholds based on the 5% two-tailed test used by academics in 
research contexts as the legal standard of proof to prove a prima facie case of 
discrimination “by a preponderance of the evidence.”10 Securities litigation constitutes 
another example; for example, on remand following Halliburton II, the trial court used 
																																																								
7 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011).  The Court held that available 
information could indicate a reliable causal relationship between two variables even if that 
relationship was not statistically significant. In that case, Matrixx, who sold an over-the-counter 
cold remedy, had information that the remedy was associated with anosmia, the loss of smell.  
The issue before the Court was whether Matrixx was required to disclose information regarding a 
relationship between the use of its product and anosmia.  Matrixx contended it did not have such 
an obligation because the information available to it did not indicate a statistically significant 
relationship.  However, the Court found that the lack of a statistically significant relationship did 
not necessarily mean that there was not a reliable causal relationship between its product and 
anosmia and that Matrixx’s failure to disclose the information was an omission of a material fact. 
8 See also Joseph L. Gastwirth, Statistical Considerations Support the Supreme Court’s Decision 
in Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 155 (2012). 
9 The court in Photochromic, supra note 5, found that “[t]here is not, however, any ‘precise level 
in the law’ at which statistical significance is sufficient to permit the inference derived from a 
correlative study. And most courts have rejected the arbitrary application of a 5% threshold.” 
(citations omitted).  
10 Garaud, supra note 6 at 467.  For a recent example, see, e.g., Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 
38 (1st Cir 2014).  See also Alison Palmer v. George P. Shultz, 815 F 2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(prima facie evidence of disparate impact under Title VII required differences in selection rates 
that were statistically significant at a 5% level). Numerous other Title VII cases have used 
statistically significant difference in outcomes as evidence of disparate impact and discrimination. 
See King, supra note 6 at 277 (describing that many lower courts have adopted the criterion of 
two or three standard deviations which can correspond to a .05 statistical significance level as a 
bright-line rule). See also Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp. _ F _ (_ ), Segar, 738 F.2d at 1282; 
Vuyanich v. Rep. Nat’l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 348 (N.D. Tex. 1980), vacated on other 
grounds 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984); Cooper v. Univ. of Tex. at Dallas, 482 F. Supp. 187, 194 
(N.D. Tex. 1979) (“It has become a convention in social science to accept as statistically 
significant values which have a probability of occurring by change 5% of the time or less.”). See 
also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (“As a general rule . . . if the difference 
between the expected value and the observed number is greater than two or three standard 
deviations, then the hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would be suspect to a social 
scientist.”). 
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statistical significance as the basis for determining dates on which it was appropriate to 
certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class action.11 
 
This paper provides an analysis of the statistical significance tests and their 
relationship to the applicable legal standard of proof, and attempts to clarify the 
consequences of a choice of statistical significance levels in such settings.  Economic 
analyses characterize legal standards of proof as relative comparisons between competing 
hypotheses put forward by the litigating parties.  The positive analysis demonstrates how 
a legal standard of proof and statistical hypothesis testing using a fixed statistical 
significance level represent alternative and generally inconsistent ways to allocate error 
costs. We also show how reconciling legal standards of proof and statistical thresholds 
can be achieved by replacing fixed significance levels with likelihood ratio tests that 
compares the relative properties of the sampling distributions of the competing 
hypotheses put forward by the parties.12 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II sets out the error cost analysis 
framework as well as the derivation of optimal legal standards of proof.  The analysis 
then examines the conditions under which existing legal standards, such as the 
preponderance rule, are optimal standards.  In Section III we describe the standard use of 
null hypothesis testing under fixed significance levels.  Section IV examines the 
relationship between statistical significance levels and legal standards of proof.  Section 
V concludes. 
	
II. Error Cost Analysis and the Design of Legal Rules 
 
In this Section, we present an error-cost analysis of optimal legal standards of 
proof.  Part A sets out the standard of proof.  Part B sets out the loss function used to 
evaluate standards of proof.  Part C derives the optimal statistical standard of proof under 
specific but, we think, reasonable assumptions about legal standards.  Part D examines 
																																																								
11 Hallibuton II, supra note 2.  See Fisch, Gelbach & Klick, supra note 2, for a discussion of the 
role of statistical significance in that case.	
12 The evaluation of the merits of any statistical analysis requires a normative analysis of the 
relative frequency and costs of these errors, and should inform the choice of the optimal test and 
significance level.  A full treatment of this last issue is beyond the scope of this paper.  In 
addition, this paper does not address many other issues related to the use and interpretation of 
statistical models in legal settings, even though there can be interplay between those issues and 
the way in which statistical inference is performed. For example, at the summary judgment (or 
trial) phase of a litigation, the issue of liability may be assumed by an expert who is calculating 
damages with a statistical model.  Such an assumption can affect the way in which statistical 
inference is performed. Another example is that at the certification phase of a class action, where 
both plaintiffs and defendants generally assume the allegations in the complaint when evaluating 
the issue of whether impact can be determined with common evidence, a defendant might not put 
forward its own, competing, statistical model and therefore inferences based on the plaintiffs’ 
model gain more importance than in circumstances where a competing model is available.  
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mathematical representations of legal standards of proof and the conditions under which 
these legal standards of proof are optimal standards. 
 
A. The Standard of Proof 
 
We consider the case where the litigants put forward competing hypotheses (H0 for 
the defendant and H1 for the plaintiff) to explain the evidence, which consists of the 
realization x of a random variable X with a density function f(X|H0) if hypothesis H0 is 
true and f(X|H1) if hypothesis H1 is true.  Figure 1 illustrates the two conditional sampling 
distributions under the litigants’ competing hypothesis.13  
 
FIGURE 1 – The Litigants’ Competing Hypotheses and the Standard of Proof xT 
 
 
 
Suppose that the plaintiff has the burden of proof or production.  Suppose also that 
the standard of proof is a threshold value xT that determines whether the plaintiff has met 
her burden.  Since the sampling distribution of X under the plaintiff’s hypothesis H1 is 
centered to the left of the sampling distribution of X under the defendant’s hypothesis H0, 
realized values of x £ (>) xT favor the plaintiff (defendant).  Table 1 sets out the decision 
rule associated with the standard of proof. 
 
																																																								
13 See generally, Louis Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests and Legal Decision Rules, 16 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 1 (2014); Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L. J. 738 (2012); Louis 
Kaplow, On the Optimal Burden of Proof, 119 J. POL ECON. 1104 (2011); Edward K. Cheng, 
Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L. J. 1254 (2013); Dominique Demougina & 
Claude Fluet, Preponderance of Evidence, 50 EURO. ECON. REV. 963 (2006). 
xT
f(X|H0)
f(X|H1)
Plaintiff	 fails	
to	meet	her	
burden
Plaintiff	
meets	her	
burden
X
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Table 1: The Standard of Proof 
 
Relationship between 
Realized Value and 
Threshold 
Legal Inference 
x £ xT Plaintiff has met her burden 
of production or proof: Reject 
H0 and accept H1. 
x > xT Plaintiff has not met her 
burden of production or proof.  
Reject H1 and accept H0. 
 
B. Error Cost Analysis and the Loss Function 
 
A preliminary matter is the choice of a “loss function” to evaluate alternative 
statistical tests and legal standards of proof.  The performance of these alternatives will 
be determined by the specific loss function chosen to evaluate the tests.  A common 
objective used to evaluate evidentiary and other procedural systems is to choose the 
system that minimizes the sum of two types of costs – expected error costs and the costs 
of the test.14 For concreteness, we adopt this approach, while recognizing that reasonable 
alternatives might exist.15 
 
The error cost matrix in Table 2 summarizes the outcomes when the standard of 
proof is xT, as suggested above.  There are two correct outcomes (the shaded boxes on the 
diagonal) where the true hypothesis is accepted. There are two types of error, Type I error 
and Type II error.  Type I errors (when the plaintiff’s hypothesis H1 is accepted when H0 
is true) occur at a rate a(xT) and generate a cost KI when they occur.  The specificity of 
the test is the rate of correct negatives, and is equal to 1- a(xT).  Type II errors (when the 
defendant’s hypothesis H0 is accepted when H1 is true) occur at a rate b(xT) and generate 
a cost KII when they occur.16  The sensitivity of test is the rate of correct positives and is 
equal to 1-b(xT). 
 
An ideal test would attempt to avoid both types of errors.  However, the extent to 
which an actual test approaches this ideal is limited by available information and the 
prohibitive costs of acquiring additional relevant and determinative information. 
																																																								
14 See generally, Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 6th Ed. (2003) at 563; See 
also Ronald J. Allen, The Error of Expected Loss Minimization, 2 L. PROB. & RISK 1, 4 (2003).   
15 For alternative approaches to optimal burden of proof rules based on the provision of incentives 
for underlying behavior, see Kaplow, supra note 13; Bruce L. Hay, & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens 
of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 413 (1997); Chris W. 
Sanchirico, The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation: A Simple Model of Mechanism Design, 17 
INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 431 (1997). 
16 The loss function does not explicitly include the benefits of correct positive and negative 
decisions.  Following the standard convention in the decision-theoretic literature, the loss 
parameters are normalized so that gains may be assumed to equal zero.	
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Table 2 – Error Cost Matrix 
 
 
 
If P(H0) and P(H1) are the prior probabilities that the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s 
hypothesis is true respectively, minimization of expected error costs plus the cost of the 
test is achieved by choosing a standard of proof xT that minimizes the following loss 
function: 
 
LF(xT) = P(H0)[a(xT)KI] + P(H1)[b(xT)KII] + C,  (1) 
 
where C is the resource cost of applying the standard of proof to the parties and to 
society.  C is assumed not to vary between alternative decision standards, but can be 
avoided if the legal system uses a standard of proof that does not require evaluation of 
evidence.  
 
C. The Optimal Standard of Proof 
 
In this section, the standard of proof x* that minimizes total expected error costs 
and direct cost is derived.  Minimizing the loss function set out in (1) requires taking the 
derivative of (1) with respect to xT and setting it equal to zero.  This yields the following 
first order condition: 
 
!"#(%∗)
!%∗
= ) *+
!, %∗
!%∗
-. + ) *0
!1 %∗
!%∗
-.. = 0  (2) 
 
Solving the first order condition (3) yields the following condition: 
 
−
!1 %∗
!%∗
!, %∗
!%∗
= 45,     (3) 
 
where 4 = 78	
788	
	(the ratio of the cost of Type I and Type II errors) and p = :(;<)
:(;=)
	(the prior 
odds in favor of *+). 
 
 Figure 2 adds the error rates a(xT) = F(xT|H0) and b(xT) = 1 - F(xT|H1) to Figure 
1, where F(X|H0) and F(X|H1) are the respective distribution functions associated with the 
density functions f(X|H0) and f(X|H0).   
 
H1 is	true	(P(H1)) H0 is	true	(P(H0))
Test	Positive	(x	£ xT) CORRECT	POSITIVE
(Sensitivity	=	1	- !(xT))
FALSE	POSITIVE	–
(Type	I	Error	Rate	=	$(xT))
(Cost	of	Type	I	error	=	KI)
Test	Negative	(x	>	xT) FALSE	NEGATIVE
(Type	II	Error	Rate	=	!(xT))	
(Cost	of	Type	II	Error	=	KII)
CORRECT	NEGATIVE
(Specificity	=	1-$(xT))
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FIGURE 2 – Type I and Type II Error Rates with Standard of Proof xT 
 
 
 
To evaluate the left-hand side of condition (3), note from Figure 2 that the 
incremental change in the Type I and Type II error rates as the threshold xT is increased 
are !, %
>
!%>
 = f(xT|H0) and 
!1 %>
!%>
 = - f(xT|H1).  Thus, for any choice of the standard of proof 
threshold xT (i.e., any choice whether optimal or not), the ratio of first derivatives that 
enters the optimality condition (3) equals the likelihood ratio evaluated at xT: 
 
−
!1 %>
!%>
!, %>
!%>
=
? %@ *0
? %@ H+
≡ "C(%@)     (4) 
 
Substituting (4) into equation (3) and evaluating at the optimal standard of proof 
threshold x*, we see that at the optimal standard of proof, the likelihood ratio must satisfy 
the following condition: 
 
"C(%∗) = 45,     (5) 
  
where neither 4 nor 5 varies with the standard of proof. Thus, the optimal standard of 
proof involves setting the likelihood ratio equal to a constant, whose value depends on 
the relative costs of Type I and Type II errors (4) and the prior odds in favor of the null 
hypothesis (5). 
 
D. Legal Standards and Optimal Standards 
 
In this section, we describe the conditions under which the optimal standard of 
proof x* derived in equation (5) coincides with mathematical representations of actual 
legal standards.  Part D.i considers the conditions where the preponderance standard, 
expressed as posterior odds equal to 1, is an optimal standard that minimzes expected 
error and direct costs.  Part D.ii considers heightened standards of proof. 
 
xT
!" #$
!#$ =	-f(x
T|H1)
!% #$
!#$ =	f(x
T|H0)
&(xT)
)(xT)
X
f(X|H0)
f(X|H1)
x*=xPP
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i. Preponderance 
 
The preponderance standard is a widely-used standard of proof in civil cases.  A 
common mathematical representation of the preponderance standard is that the plaintiff 
has met his burden under the standard when the probability of the alternative hypothesis 
is greater than 0.5.  For example, Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the 7th Circuit, 
suggested the following interpretation of the preponderance standard: 
 
[T]he trier of fact rules for the plaintiff if it thinks the chance greater than 
0.5 that the plaintiff is in the right.17 
 
This suggests the following absolute probability representation of the 
preponderance standard: 
 
p(H1|x) > .5.      (6) 
 
The use of this absolute probability standard as a mathematical representation of the 
preponderance standard has been criticized by those skeptical of the use of probabilistic 
models of evidence,18 and even by those who are not.19  The latter critics suggest the 
absolute probability representation be replaced by a ratio that compares the probabilities 
of the narratives offered by the plaintiff and defendant.  In these models, preponderance 
standard is one that holds for the plaintiff when the ratio of the conditional posterior 
probabilities evaluated at x is greater than one:20 
 
D(;=|F)
D(;<|F)
 > 1       (7)  
 
Note that when there are only two competing alternatives, so that p(H1|x) + p(H0|x) 
= 1, condition (7) and the absolute probability condition (6), that p(H1|x) > .5, are 
equivalent statements.  In addition, the ratio of the posterior probabilities in (7) equals the 
conditional odds of H1 given x. 
 
Using Bayes Rule, condition (7) is equivalent to: 
 
D(;=|F)
D(;<|F)
=
D(F|;=)
D(F|;<)
:(;=)
:(;<)
= "C(%)/p > 	1   (8) 
																																																								
17 Brown v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 342, 345 (7th Cir. 1988).	
18 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models 
of Evidence, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 107 (2007) (discussing reference-class problem); But see Edward 
K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COL. L. REV. 2081 (2009) 
(describing mathematical criteria to address choice of reference class).	
19 Cheng, supra note 18.	
20 See David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, 46 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 13 (1983). 
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Solving for LR(x) yields the preponderance rule as a likelihood ratio test: 21 
 
 Find for the plaintiff when "C % > "C %:: = p (9) 
 
Comparing the preponderance standard (9) to the optimal standard derived in (5), it 
is easy to see that the two will coincide when where the cost of Type I and Type II errors 
are equal, so that 4 = 1.  Indeed, the Supreme Court, in describing the preponderance 
standard, has suggested (albeit in dicta) that such a weighting is appropriate in certain 
civil cases: 
 
In a civil suit between two private parties for money damages, for 
example, we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an 
erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous 
verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.  A preponderance of the evidence standard 
therefore seems peculiarly appropriate for, as explained most sensibly, it 
simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is 
more probable than its nonexistence …  .22 
 
Table 3 depicts the error cost matrix in a civil case that incorporates the assumption 
that KI = KII = K, so that 4 = 1: 
 
Table 3 – Error Cost Matrix in a Civil Case 
 
 
 
Thus, when 4 = 1, the preponderance standard (9) is an optimal standard:23  
 
Find for the plaintiff when LR(x) > LR(x*) = "C %:: = 5. (10) 
 
																																																								
21 See Kaplow, supra note 13 at 14. 
22 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See also Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of 
Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547, 561 (2013) (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 
286 (1991) (explaining that the preponderance standard "results in a roughly equal allocation of 
the risk of error")). 
23 See Cheng, supra note 18.   
H1 is	true	(P(H1)) H0 is	true	(P(H0))
Test	Positive	(x	£ xT)
(liable)
CORRECT	POSITIVE
(Sensitivity	=	1	- !(xT))
FALSE	POSITIVE	–
(Type	I	Error	Rate	=	$(xT))
(Cost	of	Type	I	error	=	KI =	K)
Test	Negative	(x	>	xT)
(not	 liable)
FALSE	NEGATIVE
(Type	II	Error	Rate	=	!(xT))	
(Cost	of	Type	II	Error	=	KII =	K)
CORRECT	NEGATIVE
(Specificity	=	1-$(xT))
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Finally, consider the special case of a diffuse or non-informative prior, i.e., where 
P(H0) = P(H1) = ½, so p	= 1.  Coupled with the assumption that 4 = 1, condition (10) 
becomes: 
 
LR(x) > LR(x*) = "C %:: =	1.24   (11) 
 
 As Figure 2 is drawn, %:: is the level of proof when the parties’ competing 
densities are equal, reflecting the assumption that 4 = 5 = 1. Under these conditions, 
minimizing the loss function (1) is equivalent to minimizing the total error rate (a(xT) + 
b(xT)).   
 
For	a	given	choice	of	proof	threshold,	using	the	statistical	evidence	entails	a	
total	loss	of	[(K/2)(a(xT) + b(xT))+C].  The best feasible alternative would be to not use 
statistical evidence and settle for an approach that leads to total error probability of 1, for 
example, by always determining the issue either for the plaintiff (a=1, b=0, a+b=1) or 
for the defendant (a=0, b=1, a+b=1); that yields total cost of K/2.  Thus, total error 
costs are lower when the test is used whenever: 	
	
[(K/2)(a(xT) + b(xT))+C] < K/2,     (12) 
 
or, equivalently, whenever 
 
a(xT) + b(xT) <1-2C/K.25      (13)	
 
To illustrate how moving the standard of proof threshold affects the loss function, 
consider again the evidence and threshold xT depicted in Figure 2.  At xT, −
!1 %>
!%>
!, %>
!%>
=
"C %@ > 1, or equivalently !, %
>
!%>
	< −
!1 %>
!%>
  Thus, moving the threshold incrementally 
to the right will increase the Type I error rate by less than the decrease in the Type II 
error rate, so that the total error cost rate (a(xT) + b(xT)) and thus total error costs K(a(xT) 
+ b(xT)) will fall.  This will be true for any threshold xT < xPP.  Similarly, for any xT > xPP, 
moving the threshold incrementally to the left will increase the Type II error by less than 
the decrease in the Type I error rate.  As a result, xPP = x* when p	 = 	4 = 1. 
 
We will use this example below to illustrate the differences between legal 
standards and statistical standards of proof below.  The use of the likelihood ratio 
criterion in (11) is merely an example when there are symmetric error costs and diffuse 
																																																								
24 See Cheng, supra note 18.   
25 As noted above, this calculation assumes—via the assumption that p	 = 4 = 1—that the legal 
system is operating with diffuse priors and is indifferent to whether errors operate in favor of 
plaintiffs or defendants. A system with non-diffuse priors and that was not indifferent would have 
a boundary condition weighted toward one party type’s interests. 
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prior probabilities, and is not a normative argument that the legal system should adopt 
such priors as a proper presumption, or that such a prior should be adopted in applying 
relative probability tests.26  
 
ii. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
 
The analysis can also be applied to heightened legal standards of proof.  Table 4 
depicts the error cost matrix in a criminal trial.  The criminal error cost matrix differs 
from the civil matrix in two primary ways.  First, commentators have suggested that in 
the context of a criminal trial, the cost of a Type I error is many times the cost of a Type 
II error.27  Second, criminal trials incorporate a presumption of innocence.  Both the 
normative weighting of Type I and Type II errors and the presumption of innocence are 
consistent with the high “beyond a reasonable doubt” (BRD) standard of proof placed on 
the prosecutor in criminal trials, as well as the robust procedural protections given 
criminal defendants.28   
 
TABLE 4 – Error Cost Matrix in a Criminal Trial 
 
 
 
Rewriting (5), the optimality condition may be expressed as LR(x*)/5=4. Recalling 
that Bayes’s Theorem implies that the posterior odds in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis, p(H1|x)/p(H0|x), equals the ratio LR(x)/5, the optimal standard of proof 
induces an equality between the posterior odds and 4. When the costs of Type I errors 
are presumed to be greater than the cost of a Type II error, 4 = 78	
788	
> 1.  In addition, 
suppose that presumption of innocence reflects the prior odds 5.  If we use the 
Blackstone ratio (4 = 10),29 the posterior odds for the BRD standard of proof to be an 
																																																								
26 See Cheng, supra note 18 (arguing for use of a diffuse prior).  But see, e.g., Hay & Spier, supra 
note 14 (optimal burden considers the proportion of negligent defendants and the parties’ relative 
costs of producing evidence). 
27 Blackstone wrote that "It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 
William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765). 
28 These include Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel), Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (notice), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requirement that 
prosecutor disclose material exculpatory evidence in his possession). 
29	See	note	27,	supra.	
H1 is	true	(P(H1)) H0 is	true	(P(H0))
Test	Positive	(x	£ xT)
(guilty)
CORRECT	POSITIVE
CONVICTING	THE	GUILTY
(Sensitivity	=	1	- !(xT))
FALSE	POSITIVE	–
CONVICTING	THE	INNOCENT
(Type	I	Error	Rate	=	$(xT))
(Cost	of	Type	I	error	=	KI =	K)
Test	Negative	(x	>	xT)
(not	guilty)
FALSE	NEGATIVE
LETTING	THE	GUILTY	GO	FREE
(Type	II	Error	Rate	=	!(xT))	
(Cost	of	Type	II	Error	=	KII
=	%K,	% >	1)
CORRECT	NEGATIVE
ACQUITTNG	THE	INNOCENT
(Specificity	=	1-$(xT))
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optimal standard p(H1|x)/p(H0|x) = LR(xBRD)/p = LR(x*)/p  = 10.  Thus, to convict, the 
posterior odds would have to be greater than 10, which equates to requiring that p(H1|x) 
= .909 to convict when H1 is the only possible alternative to H0.  Similarly, if 4 = 19, the 
posterior odds for the BRD standard of proof to be an optimal standard p(H1|x)/p(H0|x) = 
LR(xBRD)/p = LR(x*)/p = 19. This equates to a requiring that p(H1|x) = .95 (a numerical 
threshold often linked to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard) to convict when H1 is 
the only possible alternative to H0.30   
 
A similar analysis could be applied to model an intermediate civil standard of proof 
(e.g., the clear and convincing evidence standard used in some civil cases).  Note that 
under this formulation, the optimal critical likelihood ratio "C(%∗) = 4p can differ from 
the preponderance threshold of LR(xPP) = 1 from equation (11) due to asymmetric error 
costs 78	
788	
= 	4	 ≠ 1  or from a non-diffuse prior/presumption :(;<)
:(;=)
= p ≠ 1 .  Thus, 
an optimal heightened civil standard (LR(x) > LR(xCCE) = LR(x*)  > 1) can incorporate the 
civil presumption p	 = 1  and asymmetric error costs (where 4 > 1), symmetric error 
costs (4 = 1) and a heightened presumption p	 > 1 , or both.  If such a standard 
requires that p(H1|x) > .75,31 though, it necessarily implies that 4 = 3 whenever the null 
and alternative hypotheses are the only possibilities, so that the clear and convincing 
standard coincides with the optimal standard when LR(x)/5 > LR(xCCE) /5 = LR(x*)/5 > 3.   
The same analysis can also generate relaxed critical likelihood ratios (LR(xALT) = LR(x*) < 
1) when the asymmetry in error costs and/or the presumption/priors are reversed. 
 
III. Hypothesis Testing and Statistical Inference 
 
A. Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing 
 
Economists, as well as other social scientists have offered expert opinions in 
litigation that utilize “null hypothesis statistical testing”.32  A null-hypothesis statistical 
test (“NHST”) is a commonly used method of statistical inference that incorporates 
																																																								
30	See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, Quantifying the Standard of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A 
Comment on Three Comments, 5 L. PROB. & RISK 267 (2006) (commenting on quantification of 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as equal to a “95% chance that the defendant is guilty”).   
See also Joseph L. Gastwirth, Statistical Reasoning in the Legal Setting, 46 AM. STATISTICIAN 
55, 57 (1992) (Reporting average probabilities associated with legal standards of proof from 
judicial survey). 
31	See, e.g., Kaplow, Burden of Proof, supra note 13 at _.	
32 While in decline in some areas of scientific inquiry, NHST using fixed significance levels is 
still the dominant paradigm in economics and many other disciplines.  For a discussion of these 
issues and the use of alternative statistical inference tools, see, Fidler, et al., Statistical Reform in 
Medicine, Psychology and Ecology, 33 J. OF SOCIO-ECONOMICS 615 (2004); Jonah B. Gelbach, 
Type II Error-Sensitive Hypothesis Testing, University of Pennsylvania Law School Working 
Paper (2017). 
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elements of two different statistical approaches pioneered by Ronald A. Fisher33 and by 
Neyman & Pearson (“N-P”).34  A NHST analysis used in litigation may offer some 
statistical result and associated fixed level of statistical significance – usually 5%.  The 
inferential focus of such an analysis is whether the difference between an observed 
outcome and the outcome under the null hypothesis is statistically different from zero at a 
5% level of statistical significance.  
 
NHST, as mentioned, includes elements of statistical methods developed by Fisher 
and N-P.  Fisher’s method was designed as an objective way to evaluate scientific 
evidence, and focuses exclusively on specifying a “null hypothesis” and examining the 
data under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true.35  Fisher promoted the use of 
fixed-significance null-hypothesis testing as a tool for identifying interesting results from 
scientific research – that is, those results with a low probability of occurring by chance 
under the null hypothesis.  Results that failed to achieve statistical significance were to be 
ignored.  
 
Fisher’s exclusive focus on the null hypothesis and statistical significance, at the 
expense of any alternative hypothesis, was intentional.  He explicitly rejected the notion 
that the costs of false negatives (Type II errors) should influence how the threshold of 
“significance” is set:36   
 
The notion of an error of the so-called "second kind," due to accepting the 
null hypothesis "when it is false" may then be given a meaning in 
reference to the quantity to be estimated.  It has no meaning with respect 
to simple tests of significance, in which the only available expectations are 
those which flow from the null hypothesis being true. 
  
Fisher was also the most influential proponent of the use the .05 or 5% significance 
test, or “rule of two”:37 
 
																																																								
33 Ronald A. Fisher, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS, 8th Ed. (1966). 
34 Jerzy Neyman & Egon S. Pearson, On the Problem of the Most Efficient Test of Statistical 
Hypothesis. PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTION OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON—SERIES A, 231 
(1933). 
35 Fisher, supra note 33 at 16 (“In relation to any experiment we may speak of this hypothesis as 
the ‘null hypothesis’ and it should be noted that the null hypothesis is never proved or established 
but it is possibly disproved in the course of the experimentation.  Every experiment may be said 
to exist only in order to give the facts a chance of disproving the null hypothesis.”) 
36 Fisher, supra note 33 at 17.  See also Zillak & McCloskey, supra note 3 at 144; Michael I 
Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The Unwitting Policy Making of 
Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 771, 823-4 (2010). 
37 Ziliak & McCloskey, supra note 3 at _ (quoting R. A. Fisher),  
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The value for which P=.05, or 1 in 20, is 1.96 or nearly 2; it is convenient 
to take this point as a limit in judging whether a deviation is to be 
considered significant or not.  Deviations exceeding twice the standard 
deviation are thus formally regarded as significant. 
 
Fisher’s 5% significance threshold originally was used as a convenient standard that 
set out an arbitrary but objective minimum level of precision for declaring research 
results “important.”38  Indeed, under the Fisher approach, arbitrary significance levels 
other than 5% could be used, did not need to be specified in advance, and could be 
applied a-posteriori to a given set of data. 
 
Neyman and Pearson’s alternative approach to statistical inference attempted to 
improve on significance testing through a focus on applied decision making and tests of 
acceptance between competing hypotheses. N-P used the term significance to denote the 
probability of a false positive or Type I error.  Like Fisher, N-P also used “convenient” 
significance levels, including .05, to set an acceptable level of Type I errors.  However, 
unlike Fisher’s approach to significance levels, which could be applied a-posteriori, the 
N-P approach required an a-priori choice of a significance level.  N-P's approach also 
required the specification of an alternative hypothesis in addition to specifying the null.   
 
N-P’s explicit consideration of alternative hypotheses in turn allowed consideration 
of “effect size” as well as the explicit consideration of the rate of Type I and Type II 
errors and the ability to establish tests that would have the highest power. Given the 
choice of the rate of Type I error and an alternative hypothesis, Type II errors were to be 
controlled by ensuring the data was of sufficient sample size given the effect size. 
 
Descriptions and definitions of NHST vary, but can be described as a general set of 
“cookbook” procedures used to carry out statistical testing rather than a precise 
methodology for conducting statistical inference.  While application of NHST varies, it 
does encompass a certain set of procedures that incorporate elements of both Fisher’s and 
N-P’s approaches without attempting the difficult task of reconciling inconsistent 
approaches into a unified methodology.39   
 
NHST generally begins with the specification of a null hypothesis and a choice of an 
arbitrary significance level, with the 5% significance level commonly used.  An 
alternative hypothesis is also specified.  However, the level of specificity of the 
alternative hypothesis varies.  The most common or what we will refer to as the 
“standard” approach is to use a non-specific alternative hypothesis (e.g., when the 
alternative is the negation of the null hypothesis or a one-directional alternative, known 
as a composite alternative).  If the alternative hypothesis is not specific, then NHST will 
more closely resemble Fisher’s approach to significance testing.   
																																																								
38 Id at 45-6.  See also Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 36. 
39 For a discussion of the two approaches being complementary rather than contradictory, see E. 
L. Lehmann, The Fisher, Newyman-Person Theories of Testing Hypotheses:. One Theory or 
Two?, 88 JASA 424 (1993).	
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A more specific alternative hypothesis will allow consideration of statistical power 
and effect size, and will more closely resemble the N-P approach to tests of acceptance.  
As will be set out below in more detail, our approach to applying NHST to make legal 
inferences will more closely follow a modified N-P approach using tests of acceptance. 
Our approach relies on specifying a specific alternative hypothesis and allowing for 
consideration of statistical power and effect size.  However, because the sample size is 
effectively fixed in many legal settings, our approach will also emphasize implementation 
of the tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors implied by the applicable legal standard 
for a given sample size. 
 
B. Null and Alternative Hypotheses 
 
In order to illustrate both the NHST approach to hypothesis testing and to compare 
this approach to the general error cost framework set out in Section II, we use the 
following example throughout the remainder of the paper.40  Suppose that an employer 
fills N vacancies by hiring thirty percent women and seventy percent men.41  A non-hired 
female applicant sues the employer under Title VII for discriminating against women.42  
The complaint alleges that the employer’s hiring practices had a disparate impact on 
women.43  The plaintiff’s initial burden of production is to prove, by a preponderance of 
evidence, a prima facie case of statistical discrimination.44  In such cases, this is achieved 
by showing that the number of women hired is lower than expected, and that the 
difference is significant given the court's choice of significance level.45 
 
 
																																																								
40 The basic structure of the example is taken from Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the 
Courtroom, 85 COL. L. REV. 1048, 1058 (1985). 
41 This paper does not address the EEOC 4/5 rule for disparate impact, which examines the effects 
of employment selection criteria and finds a prima facie case if the ratio of selection rates of 
women to men is less than .8.  For a comparison of the EEOC 4/5 rule and statistical significance, 
see Peresie, supra note 6, and Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 6 at _.  The use of the binomial 
probability models used in the example in the paper may be relevant if the selection mechanism 
responsible for the disparate treatment is not observable.  For example, suppose that a firm fills 
ten slots by offering the jobs to the first ten applications pulled out of a large drum.  However, the 
employee who is responsible for placing the applications in the drum systematically places the 
applications of some women at the bottom of the drum.  In this case, the observed selection rate 
for men and women will both be 1.  For an example of such a process in the context of race and 
jury selection, see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (black persons in the jury pool had 
different colored tickets than whites). 
42 Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.  See generally, 
Peresie, supra note 6; Garaud, supra note 6. 
43 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
44 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
45	See Garaud, supra note 6 at 467.	
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The inferential problem for both legal and statistical analysis is to decide when the 
observed outcome (a lower than expected number of women hired) favors an alternative 
hypothesis that the employer is discriminating against women over the null hypothesis 
that the employer hired employees without regard to the applicant’s sex.46  Under a fixed-
significance level NHST approach to statistical inference, the null hypothesis of no 
discrimination is rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis of discrimination when the 
observed outcome x is less than a threshold xC determined by an arbitrarily set fixed level 
of statistical significance.  As set out in Section II, evidentiary standards and burdens of 
proof and production, such as the preponderance of evidence, also use threshold levels of 
the same observed outcome to determine liability.  A key issue is to analyze how these 
alternative threshold values are determined, and to provide a framework for evaluating 
both the consistency and performance of alternative thresholds.  
 
As noted above, the NHST approach to statistical inference compares one hypothesis 
(the “null” hypothesis denoted H0) to an “alternative” hypothesis (denoted H1) or to a set 
of alternative hypotheses. We first describe in more detail the concepts of null and 
alternative hypotheses, and present an example that will be used to illustrate the concepts 
and alternative approaches to statistical inference. 
 
i. The Null Hypothesis (H0) 
 
The null hypothesis is the hypothesis to be tested; in the parlance of statistics, the 
null hypothesis will either be rejected or fail to be rejected.  It is commonly defined as the 
hypothesis that any observed difference (for example, between two sample means or a 
sample mean and baseline value) is due to random chance and not systematic causes.   
 
In the gender discrimination example, the null hypothesis (H0) is that the employer 
hires N employees without regard to sex from a large pool of equally qualified applicants.  
In the pool of qualified applicants, p0 is the proportion of qualified applicants that are 
female, and 1 - p0 is the proportion of qualified applicants that are male.  In terms of the 
defendant’s hypothesis discussed in Section II, the null and defendant’s hypothesis would 
be the same. 
 
The firm actually hires x females and N – x males.  Let X be the random variable 
representing the number of women hired, so that under the null hypothesis, X has 
																																																								
46 The inquiry here is a preliminary one – whether the plaintiff has met his initial burden of 
production for a prima facie case.   The general principles analyzed in this paper can be applied to 
other types of preliminary thresholds such as the plausibility standard to decide motions to 
dismiss in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues 
& Rights, 551 U.S. 308 (2007), the standard for summary judgment under Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), or the burden of proof for final 
adjudication.  This issue is discussed in Section IV.E infra.  
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approximately a binomial sampling distribution, with a probability density function given 
by:47  
 
N %:P, Q+ =
R
F
Q+
F 1 − Q+
RSF.		   (14) 
 
The binomial density function gives the probability of hiring exactly x females for 
the N open slots.  The expected number of females hired if H0 is true is µ0 = Np0, and the 
variance equals s02 = Np0(1-p0).  For example, if the firm hires N = 10 qualified workers 
without regard to the sex of the applicant from a qualified pool that is half female and 
half male, the probability that a given hire will be a female is p0 =.5 under H0.48  Thus, 
under the assumption that the relevant pool of qualified workers is half male and half 
female, the null hypothesis is equivalent to a null hypothesis that p0 = .5.  From the well-
known properties of the binomial distribution, the expected number of females hired 
equals µ0 = Np0 = 5, and the variance equals s02 = Np0(1-p0) = 2.5.  Figure 3 depicts the 
sampling distribution of the number of women hired under H0, i.e., when p0 = .5 and N = 
10. In the figure, the horizontal axis measures the number of women that could be hired, 
x, which can range from 0 to 10.  The vertical axis measures the probability X takes on 
each of these values, when the null hypothesis is true. 
 
The null sampling distribution in Figure 3 illustrates that even when the firm hires 
applicants without considering the sex of the applicant, it is not the case that a given 
hiring cycle always will produce an observed outcome where half of new hires are men 
and half are women.  In fact, when an employer selects qualified workers without regard 
to sex, and the qualified pool is half men and half women, we would expect that outcome 
to occur a shade less than one quarter of the time. Examining Figure 1, the probability 
that exactly five women and five men would be hired when H0 is true (p(X=5|H0)) equals 
0.2461 (or 24.61%).   
 
In the hypothetical example set out above the employer hired 70% men and 30% 
women. With N = 10, this means 3 women and 7 men would be hired for the ten 
																																																								
47 For a discrete random variable, such as a count of the number hired, the usual term is the 
probability mass function; the term probability density function is used when the random variable 
of interest has a continuous distribution. Since nothing important will be changed by ignoring this 
distinction for purposes of our discussion, we use the term “density” throughout. Note also that 
the sampling distribution for the number of count variable (the number of women hired, X,) is 
only approximately binomially distributed because the pool of qualified applicants is sampled 
without replacement.  The precise distribution is a hypergeometric one, but using a binomial 
distribution here will simplify the discussion without changing anything important (A general rule 
of thumb is that the binomial sampling distribution for counts can be used when the population is 
at least 20 times as large as the sample, a condition likely met in most applications). 
48 Our examples set p0 = .5.  When the qualified pools are not 50% female and 50% male, then p0 
will deviate from .5.  See	Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, _ (1989) (citing 
Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)), "[t]he proper comparison 
[was] between the racial composition of [the at-issue jobs] and the racial composition of the 
qualified . . . population in the relevant labor market." 
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vacancies.  The probability of this outcome (x = 3) under the null hypothesis is 11.72%, 
and the probability that three or fewer women will be hired equals 17.18% (the sum of 
the four relevant probabilities).  The “significance” of these numbers will be addressed 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 – Binomial Sampling Distribution of the Number of Women Hired (X) 
Under the Null Hypothesis (p0 = .5 and N = 10) 
 
 
 
ii. The Alternative Hypothesis (H1) 
 
Under NHST, the alternative hypothesis is the hypothesis that is favored when the 
null is rejected.  There are several types of alternative hypotheses.  These include non-
specific compound hypotheses that are used in the “standard” approach to NHST, which 
include non-directional alternative hypotheses, one-and two-tailed directional alternative 
hypotheses, and point hypotheses.49  Non-directional alternative hypothesis, such as the 
negation of the null hypothesis, are often used in settings where the only concern is 
whether the null hypothesis is true.  Directional alternative hypotheses can be one-tailed, 
where only one tail of the region of rejection is of concern, or two tailed, where both 
regions of rejections are of concern.  In the discrimination example set out above, a non-
directional alternative hypothesis would be that p0 ¹ .5. But such a two-tailed alternative 
hypothesis makes no sense in an employment discrimination lawsuit.  To see this, 
																																																								
49 As noted above, hypotheses that encompass more than one possibility are called composite 
hypotheses.  Composite hypotheses may include any number of point hypotheses.   
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suppose the employer-defendant actually hired 9 women out of 10 total hires.  Even 
though this is a very unlikely outcome if the employer hires in a sex-neutral way, it is 
unlikely in a way that would provide evidence the employer favors female plaintiffs, 
rather than discriminating against them.  No court would direct or uphold a verdict 
against the employer under such conditions.  The relevant alternative hypothesis would 
be a directional one, often known as a one-tailed alternative hypothesis (that women are 
hired less than half the time, or p1 < .5).  
 
Our analysis in this paper will rely on the third general type of alternative 
hypothesis, point or specific alternative hypotheses.50  Point alternative hypotheses are 
hypotheses where the sampling distribution under the alternative hypothesis is a fully 
defined distribution with no unknown parameters.  While their explicit use in empirical 
analysis is relatively rare, specific alternative hypotheses are fundamental to the N-P 
approach to statistical inference, and the associated determining concepts of statistical 
power, effect size, and optimal likelihood ratio tests under the Neyman-Pearson lemma.51  
Use of point or specific alternative hypotheses also is helpful to understanding the 
relationship between statistical inference and legal inference discussed in Section II.  
Both Kaplow’s approach to legal decision rules—based on Neyman-Pearson likelihood 
ratio tests52—and Cheng’s relative probability approach use specific alternative 
hypotheses.53  And recent approaches to legal inference and burdens of proof incorporate 
specific explanations of the evidence, the legal analog of point hypotheses. Pardo & 
Allen’s explanation-based reasoning and the process of inference to the best explanation 
make use of a finite set of specific explanations, generated by the parties in the first stage 
of the two-stage explanation-based inferential process.54   
 
Table 5 provides example data for a null hypothesis and three specific alternative 
hypotheses based on the discrimination example.  The Table lists the values of the 
																																																								
50 This paper does not consider composite hypotheses.  For an approach to balancing Type I and 
Type II error costs in such situations, see Gelbach, supra note 32.	
51	In terms of the example set out above,	the Neyman-Pearson lemma states that when performing 
a test between two specific hypotheses, H0 and H1, the likelihood ratio test which rejects H0 in 
favor of H1 when the likelihood ratio evaluated at x is greater than some threshold likelihood ratio 
is the most powerful test for a given significance level. Under some conditions, the Neyman-
Pearson lemma can sometimes be generalized to composite alternative hypotheses (though it 
generally cannot when the alternative is simply the two-tailed negation of a point-null 
hypothesis).	
52	See Kaplow, supra note 13.	
53 Cheng, supra note 18.  
54 Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 L. & PHIL. 
223, _ (2008) (discussing factors that determine the inferential interests and the level of detail of 
the explanations); Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557 (2013) (distinguishing “relative plausibility theory” from mathematical 
approaches to evidence); Pardo, supra note _ (explaining how inference to the best explanation 
explains evidentiary law). 
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sampling distribution density function for the null and each of the alternative 
distributions, as well as the ratio of the density function for each of the specific 
alternatives relative to the null, the likelihood ratio LR(X).55   
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: Null and Specific Alternative Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis a. Null (H0) b. Alt. (H1b) c. Alt. (H1c) d. Alt. (H1d) 
Probability 
female is hired 
p0 = .5 p1b = .444 p1c = .375 p1d = 0 
Number of 
Women Hired 
(X) 
f(X|H0) f(X|H1b) LR(X) f(X|H1c) LR(X) f(X|H1d) LR(X) 
0 0.0010 0.003 3.0 0.009	 9.0 1 1000 
1 0.0097 0.023 2.3 0.055 5.5 0 0 
2 0.0439 0.081 1.8 0.147 3.3 0 0 
3 0.1172 0.173 1.5 0.236 2.0 0 0 
4 0.2051 0.241 1.2 0.248 1.2 0 0 
5 0.2461 0.231 0.9 0.178 0.7 0 0 
6 0.2051 0.154 0.7 0.089 0.4 0 0 
7 0.1172 0.070 0.6 0.031 0.3 0 0 
8 0.0439 0.021 0.5 0.007 0.2 0 0 
9 0.0097 0.004 0.4 0.001 0.1 0 0 
10 0.0010 0.0003 0.3 5.5E-05 0.1 0 0 
 
The first column of Table 5 provides probabilities under the null hypothesis, 
described above, the hypothesis that the firm hires qualified employees without regard to 
gender.  The last column (Column d) represents the specific alternative hypothesis that 
the firm does not hire women (H1d).  The number of women hired is generated by a 
binomial sampling distribution with parameter p1b = 0.    Column c represents the specific 
alternative hypothesis that the firm discards applications submitted by married women, 
and thus when it hires women, hires only those who are single (H1c).  Assuming 40% of 
qualified females are married and 60% are single, the probability that a woman is hired 
under this alternative hypothesis is 3/8 (or .375).56  The number of women hired will be 
																																																								
55 See note 51, supra. Rubinfeld, supra note 40 at _. 
56 Under H1c, suppose that all applications from qualified married women are discarded.  The 
remaining set of applications is then forwarded to the hiring committee, and 10 are randomly 
picked.  Maintaining the assumption that 50% of the applicants are women and 50% are men, 
under H1c, 40% of the women (2/5) and 20% of the total files (2/10) are discarded, and p1c = .3/.8 
= .3750.  The same probability can be derived from a sequential process where applications from 
qualified married women that are randomly picked are not considered and thrown back into the 
large pile of applications, while applications from qualified men and single women are approved.  
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generated by a binomial sampling distribution with parameter p1c = .375.  Finally, 
Column (b) represents the specific alternative hypothesis that the firm only hires women 
without children (H1b).  Assuming 20% of qualified females have children, the 
probability that a woman will be hired under this alternative hypothesis is 4/9, or p1b 
= .444.57  Figure 4 shows the binomial sampling distributions for the four hypotheses in 
Table 1. 
 
FIGURE 4 – The Null and Specific Alternative Distributions 
 
 
 
C. Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing and Fixed Significance Levels 
 
When NHST is implemented with a fixed significance level, the null hypothesis is 
rejected when the observed number of females hired has a p-value less than a (the fixed 
significance level).   The p-value is the probability of observing an outcome equal to or 
more extreme than the observed value when the null hypothesis is true.58  Consider the 
discrimination example set out above. Examining Figure 3, the one-tailed p-value 
associated with observing 3 or fewer women hired when the null hypothesis is true 
equals .1718. If the conventional a = .05 significance level is applied to this outcome, the 
deviation of 3/10 females hired from the expected 5/10 under the null hypothesis is not 
statistically significant (as the p-value = .172 > a = .05).  In fact, the deviation of 2/10 
females hired from the expected 5/10 is not statistically significant at the conventional .05 
level either (with a p-value = .055 > a = .05).  Only observed outcomes where zero or 
one female out of ten would be statistically significant based on a test that required p-
values below a = .05. 
 
																																																								
57 Under H1b, suppose that all applications from women with children are discarded. Thus, under 
H1b, 20 percent (1/5) of the women and 10 percent of the total files (1/10) are screened out, and 
p1b = .4/.9 = .444.	
58 See Federal Judicial Center, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 3rd ed. (2011) at 
250. 
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FIGURE 5 – Threshold for Significance Level a = .05 
 
 
 
Thus, the threshold of statistical significance based on p-values < .05 is between 
one and two females hired out of 10, and is illustrated in Figure 5.  Figure 5 shows the 
distribution of outcomes when the null is true.  When the null hypothesis is true, the a 
= .05 significance test erroneously rejects the null when 0 or 1 females out of 10 are 
hired.  As Table 3 indicates, these outcomes are false positives or Type I errors.  This 
type of error occurs with probability .0107. 
 
Setting the significance level at a ensures that the Type I error rate will be no 
greater than α.  In the discrete binomial example illustrated in Figure 5, setting the 
significance level a = .05 results in a Type I error rate of less than .05.  This is due to the 
discrete nature of the binomial distribution.  Figure 6 further illustrates how setting a 
= .05 fixes the Type I error rate to be equal to a = .05.  The top panel of Figure 6 
superimposes the normal approximation onto the binomial distribution in the case where 
N = 10.59  With a normal distribution, an a = .05 significance level corresponds to a one-
																																																								
59 The normal approximation with N = 10 is used for convenience to illustrate why a is the rate of 
Type I error.  However, in general, the normal approximation is not accurate for small values of 
N. The normal approximation is appropriate when Np > 10 and Np(1-p) > 10, conditions which 
are not met in this example. 
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tailed critical value equal to 2.40 (or 1.645 standard deviations below the mean).60  The 
bottom panel of Figure 6 shows the left one-tailed normal distribution cutoff for a a = .05 
significance level.  When the null hypothesis is true, rejecting the null hypothesis when x 
< xC = 2.401 will erroneously reject the null hypothesis 5% of the time when x is a 
normally distributed continuous variable.61 
 
FIGURE 6 – The Normal Approximation of the Null Distribution and a = .05 
Normal Distribution Critical Values for a One-Tailed Test 
 
 
 
D. Type II Error and Statistical Power with a Fixed-a = .05 NHST 
 
The fixed-a = .05 NHST considers only Type I error and the sampling distribution 
under the null hypothesis.  Thus, in a fixed N setting, this approach ignores the rate and 
costs of Type II error as well as the distribution of the alternative hypothesis.  
Determining the rate of Type II errors associated with a fixed-a = .05 NHST requires 
																																																								
60 Using the standard deviation from the underlying binomial distribution, with N = 10 and p0 
= .5, which equals [Np0(1-p0)]1/2 = [10(.5)(.5)] ½ = .158, 1.645 standard deviations equals 2.599, 
and 1.96 standard deviations equals 3.097.  The left-hand cutoff for a a = .05 one tailed test 
equals 5 – 2.599 = 2.401 and the left-hand cutoff for a two-tailed test equals 5 – 3.097 = 1.903.	
61 When the null distribution can be approximated by a normal distribution with known 
parameters (µ0 = Np0, s02 = Np0(1-p0)), a standardized test statistic (Z = (x - µ0)/s0) can be 
calculated and compared to the applicable cutoff for the fixed a null hypothesis test.   For an a 
= .05 one tailed test, the null hypothesis is rejected if |Z| > 1.645. 
a =	.05
xC=2.40
1.645SD	=	
1.645*1.5811	
=	2.601
Mean	=	5,	SD	=	1.5811.
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explicit consideration of the applicable sampling distribution under the relevant 
alternative hypothesis.  To illustrate the power associated with a fixed-a = .05 NHST, 
suppose that the plaintiff alleges that the firm’s hiring practices discriminate against 
married women. The null hypothesis remains the same and the alternative hypothesis is 
now described by H1c.  Under H1c, the plaintiff alleges that the firm discriminates against 
married women, who make up 40% of the qualified pool of females.  The relevant 
sampling distribution is a binomial distribution with parameter p1c = .375. 
 
FIGURE 7 – Distribution of the Number of Women Hired under the Null and H1c, 
Fixed-a = .05 NHST 
 
 
Figure 7 shows both the null and the alternative distribution of X given H1c when 
the firm attempts the fill ten vacancies (N = 10).  As shown above, a fixed a = .05 NHST 
will result in a critical value that rejects the null hypothesis of no discrimination if one or 
zero women are hired.  This results in a probability of erroneously rejecting the null when 
the null is true equal to .0107.   This Type I error rate is calculated by adding the 
probability of observing less than 2 women hired when the null is true, or adding the 
frequencies from the null distribution to the left of the cutoff.  A Type II error occurs 
when the fixed-a = .05 NHST fails to reject the null when the alternative is true.  The 
Type II error rate is calculated by adding the probability of observing 2 or more women 
hired when the alternative is true, or adding the frequencies from the alternative 
distribution to the right of the cutoff.  The Type II error rate of the fixed-a = .05 NHST 
is .9363 in this case, so under *0T the sum of Type I and Type II error rates is 0.947.   
 
IV. Legal and Statistical Significance Compared 
 
In this section, the error cost analysis discussed in Section II is compared to fixed-
significance level NHST discussed in Section III.  The fixed-significance level NHST is 
conceptually different than the error cost analysis. The standard approach to fixed-a = .05 
NHST begins with the application of the “standard” or “conventional” significance level 
of 5%. The fixed-a = .05 NHST considers only Type I error rates and the null 
distribution in fixing the Type I error rate at 5%.  The rate and costs of Type II errors as 
well as the distribution of the alternative hypothesis are ignored.   
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In terms of the error cost matrix illustrated in Table 2, fixing the significance level 
at a is equivalent to setting the Type I error rate at a irrespective of the level of Type II 
error b.  Table 6 illustrates the error cost matrix for the disparate impact discrimination 
example when a fixed a = .05 NHST is used.  Suppose that the legal standard to prove a 
prima facie case of disparate impact is a statistically significant deviation in the number 
of women hired relative to the expected number under the null hypothesis. A Type I error 
is the rejection of the null hypothesis (a positive test, finding there is a significant 
deviation) when the null hypothesis is true (i.e., the firm hires qualified workers without 
regard to sex). A Type II error is the failure to reject the null hypothesis (a negative test, 
failing to reject the null) when the null hypothesis is false (the firm discriminated against 
women when making employment decisions).62  The thresholds for significance levels 
are set without consideration of the rate of Type II error or any reference to or 
consideration of the potential alternative distributions.63  
 
TABLE 6 – Error Cost Matrix in a Fixed-a NHST 
 
 
 
In contrast, the error cost analysis presented in Section II considers both Type I and 
Type II error rates, the distributions of both the null and alternative hypotheses, as well as 
the costs associated with avoiding the two types of errors.  As will be discussed below, 
given these differences, the two approaches generally will produce different tests and 
different outcomes. To the extent that legal standards and procedures consider both the 
costs of Type I and Type II errors, it would be mere coincidence if a standard that fixes 
the rate of one type of error (Type I errors), without considering either the relative cost or 
the rate of Type II errors, just happened to minimize the applicable loss function.  
   
For expositional purposes, we focus in this section on the civil standard of 
preponderance of the evidence with diffuse priors.  Under these conditions, the 
																																																								
62 There is a preference for using the term “do not reject” or “fail to reject” rather than “accept” 
the null hypothesis.  See, e.g., Robert V. Hogg & Elliot Tanis, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL 
INFERENCE, _ ed. at 243.   
63 See Ziliak & McCloskey, supra note 3. 
Alternative	is	true	(Firm	
discriminates	against	
women)
Null	is	true	(Firm	picks	
employees	without	
regard	to	sex)
Test	Positive	(x	£ xC)
(statistically	significant)
CORRECT	POSITIVE
CORRECT	INFERENCE	OF	
STATISTICAL	
DISCRIMINATION
(Power/Sensitivity	
=	1	- !(xC) =	?)
FALSE	POSITIVE	–
INCORRECT	INFERENCE	OF	
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(Type	I	Error	Rate	
=	$(xC))	=	.05)
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preponderance test is identical to the LR(x*) = 1 optimal test that minimizes sum of the 
error rates a + b.  This section compares this mathematical formulation of the civil legal 
standard under these conditions and the fixed-a statistical test.  
 
 
 
 
A. Fixed-a =.05 NHST Versus LR(x*) = 1, Minimum a + b Tests 
 
Figure 8 depicts the properties of the LR(x*) = 1 test that minimizes a + b when the 
null hypothesis of no discrimination (p0 = .5) is tested against the alternative H1c 
hypotheses that the firm does not hire married women (p1c = .375) and N = 10.  The 
LR(x*) = 1 test rejects the null hypothesis when less than five women are hired.  In 
contrast, as shown in Figure 7, the Fixed-a =.05 NHST test reject the null hypothesis 
when less than two women are hired.  Thus xC < xPP = x*. 
 
Note that while the LR(x*) = 1 test has a higher Type I error rate (a(x*) = .3770) 
than the fixed-a = .05 NHST depicted in Figure 5 (a(xC) = .0107), it will have much 
lower Type II error rate (b(x*) = .3057) than the fixed-a = .05 NHST (with a b(xC) 
= .9363).  As a result, the sum of a(x*) + b (x*)= .6827 for the LR(x*) = 1 test is lower 
than the sum of a(xC) + b(xC) = .947 for the fixed-a = .05 NHST.64   
 
FIGURE 8 – Distribution of the Number of Women Hired under the Null and H1c, 
LR(x*) = 1 Minimum a + b Test  
 
 
 
The same tradeoffs are illustrated in Figure 9.  On the horizontal axis is the 
specificity of the test, or the rate at which the test correctly fails to reject the null 
hypothesis when the null is true.  The vertical axis measures the power of the test, or the 
																																																								
64 In addition to producing higher error costs, the a = .05 fixed-significance level test would not 
satisfy the boundary condition (3’) for a cost-effective test, and its use would result in losses plus 
direct costs that are higher than if the test were simply not performed. This is due to the very high 
Type II error rate associated with this test. 
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rate at which the test correctly rejects the null when the alternative hypothesis is true.  A 
perfect test would have power and specificity of 1, and is located at the upper right hand 
corner of the Figure.  Under the circumstances posited in the example, such tests are 
unattainable with a finite number of observations.  Given the cost and limitations of 
information in determining an outcome, there will be a set of feasible tests which differ in 
terms of the rates of errors and the costs associated with administering and participating 
in the test. Determining which of the many feasible, but imperfect, tests is preferred will 
depend on the relative cost of Type I and Type II errors.   
 
 
FIGURE 9 – Loss Function and Feasible Significance Tests for H1c 
 
 
 
Combinations of power and specificity that are attainable with a finite (N = 10) 
number of observations are depicted in the Figure, and lie along the curve labeled the 
“production possibilities curve.” This curve contains the possible combinations of 
specificity and power as the threshold cutoff of the number of females hired is moved 
from greater than 10 (unconditionally accept the null) to less than zero (unconditionally 
reject the null). The former lies at the bottom right corner of the Figure, and yields a test 
with perfect specificity and zero power.   The latter lies at the top left corner of the 
Figure, and yields a test with zero specificity and perfect power.  These tests are in the set 
of non-informative or “useless” tests, i.e., those that have a likelihood ratio equal to one 
for all values of X.  Such tests return results (positive or negative) that are the same 
whether the null or alternative is true.65  
 
																																																								
65 Such tests include per se rules (tests that always come out one way), as well as random tests 
(e.g., deciding guilt or innocence through the outcome of a coin toss).   See Finkelstein & Levin, 
supra note 6 at _. 
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The Figure depicts, in the grey shaded area labeled “cost effective tests”, the set of 
tests that satisfy the boundary condition (13) under the assumption that 2C/K = .3.  
Finally, Figure 9 depicts the test on the production possibilities curve that minimizes a + 
b.  Under the assumption that p	= 4 =1, tests with equal levels of expected losses given 
by equation (1) lie along line with slope of -1.  Among the feasible tests, the test that 
minimizes the total error cost rate a + b is the test where the slope of the production 
possibilities curve is tangent to the minimum a + b line (the dashed line in the Figure).  
This test is the LR(x*) = 1 test that rejects the null hypothesis when the number of females 
hired x is less than 5.  The LR(x*) = 1 test, based on the binomial probabilities from the 
null and alternative H1c binomial distributions, yields a Type I error rate a(x*) = .377, a 
Type II error rate b(x*) = .306, and a total error rate a(x*) + b(x*) = .683.   Under the 
assumption that 2C/K = .3, this test satisfies the boundary condition (13), as a(x*) + b(x*) 
= .683 < 1 - .3 = .7 
 
Figure 10 shows where the LR(x*) = 1 test and the fixed-a = .05 NHST lie on the 
production possibilities curve under H1c (where p1c = .375) when N = 10.  The fixed-a 
= .05 NHST is located on the production possibilities curve in the dark shaded region 
closest to the dashed horizontal line labeled a = .05. As discussed above, this rule rejects 
the null hypothesis when less than two women are hired and generates a sum of Type I 
and Type II error rates (a(xC) + b(xC)) close to 1, the measure of a non-informative or 
useless test.  In contrast, the LR(x*) = 1 test on the production possibilities curve that 
minimizes the sum of the error rates (a(x*) + b(x*)) produces a lower total error cost rate 
equal to .6827, and lies on an (a + b)-line with a lower total error rate.  The test also lies 
within the cost-effective range.  
 
FIGURE 10 – LR(x*) = 1, Minimum a + b Test versus Fixed-a = .05 NHST 
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B. a, b and the Relevant Alternative Hypothesis 
 
The properties of the LR(x*) = 1 test depend on the specified alternative hypothesis, 
and can generate levels of a that are less than or greater than .05.  To illustrate this point, 
consider Alternative Hypothesis d (H1d), the hypothesis that the firm does not hire 
women, so that p1d = 0.  Figure 11 shows distributions of the number of women hired for 
both the null and Alternative Hypothesis (H1d) on the same graph. A fixed-a = .05 NHST 
(which rejects the null when fewer than 2 women are hired) produces a Type I error rate 
of .0107.  Because the distribution under Alternative Hypothesis (H1d) has 100% its mass 
at 0, the probability of 2 or more women being hired under H1d is zero.  Thus, this test 
produces a Type II error rate of zero.  While the fixed-a = .05 NHST produces low Type 
I and zero Type II errors, a superior test exists which lowers Type I error without 
producing Type II error.  This is the test that rejects the null hypothesis when zero 
women are hired.  Compared to the fixed-α test, this test does not increase b, but it does 
reduce a by .01.  
 
FIGURE 11 – Distribution of the Number of Women Hired under the Null and 
Alternative d 
 
 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the LR(x*) = 1 test that minimizes a + b for all the three 
alternative hypotheses contained in Table 1. In addition to the production possibility 
curve for Alternative Hypothesis H1c depicted in Figure 9, Figure 12 also contains the 
production possibility curve for the other two alternative hypotheses listed in Table 1, H1b 
(the firm does not hire women with children) and H1d (the firm does not hire women).  
The LR(x*) = 1 test that minimizes a + b for H1d has high power and high specificity, and 
is a near perfect test that lies in the upper right hand corner of the Figure.   The LR(x*) = 1 
test that minimizes a + b for H1b, in contrast, is not cost effective.  For example, the 
LR(x*) = 1 test that minimizes a + b under H1b has the same a(x*) = .377 as the test that 
minimizes a + b under H1c.  However, the test has a lower power, and thus a higher b.  
This is because the test under H1b is attempting to discern between two hypotheses that 
are much closer to each other (p0 = .5 versus p1b = .444, a difference of .056) that the test 
0.
00
1
0.
01
0
0.
04
4 0.
11
7 0.
20
5
0.
24
6
0.
20
5
0.
11
7
0.
04
4
0.
01
0
0.
00
1
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
0.600
0.700
0.800
0.900
1.000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Null Hypothesis Alt d (p=0)
Fail to Reject H0 (β = 0)Reject H0 (α = .0107)
Fail to Reject H0 (β = 0)Reject H0 (α = .001)
	
	 32	
under H1c (p0 = .5 versus p1b = .375, a difference of .125).  Thus, for tests of equal 
significance, H1b will have lower power than H1c.  
 
FIGURE 12 – Alternative Hypotheses and the Nature of the a + b Minimizing Test 
 
 
 
The LR(x*) = 1 tests under H1b, H1c, and H1d produce Type I error rates of a(x*) 
= .38, .62, and less than .001 respectively.  
 
C. a, b and N 
  
The	rate	of	the	errors	a and b are affected by the sample size, N, which in turn 
determines the standard deviation of the underlying distributions of the null and 
alternative hypotheses. For a fixed-a NHST test, a higher N will result in greater power 
(a lower b), but—by design—no change in α. Figure 13 illustrates the production 
possibilities curve of the LR(x*) = 1 test for H1c	for	different	levels	of	N.			In	addition	to	
the	production	possibilities	curve	for	N	=	10	that	is	illustrated	above,	Figure	13	
provides	the	production	possibilities	curve	for	N	=	100	and	N	=	1000.			As	shown	
above,	the	fixed-a = .05 NHST for H1c and N = 10 yields	error	rates	a(xC) = .0107 and 
b(xC) = .9363.  When N = 100, a(xC) = .04 and b(xC) = .204 and when N = 1000, a(xC) 
= .047 and b(xC) = .0001.   
 
For the LR(x*) = 1 tests, the minimum a and b decrease as N increases.  While	the	
minimum a + b test for H1c	with	N	=	10	yields	error	rates	a(x*) = .377 and b(x*) = .306, 
the error rates fall to a(x*) = .097 and a b(x*) = .108 when N =100, and a(x*) = .00003 
and a b(x*) = .00004 when N = 1000. 
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FIGURE 13 - Number of Observations and the Nature of the a + b Minimizing Test 
	
	
	
The	relationship	between	a, b and N can be further illustrated by considering the 
normal approximations to the null and alternative distributions as N varies.  Table 6 lists 
the mean and standard deviation of the null and alternative distribution, H1c of x for N = 
10, 100, and 1000.  The table also lists the critical values xC for a one tailed a = .05 
NHST, and the critical value x* for the LR(x*) = 1 test that minimizes a + b.  
 
Table 6 – Distribution Properties and N Using Normal Approximation,  
with UVW  as Alternative Hypothesis  
 
 
 
Figure 14A depicts the normal approximation to the null distribution f(x|H0) and 
alternative distribution f(x|H1c) for N = 10.  The a = .05 one-tail critical value for this 
distribution is xC = 2.40, and the power of a test that rejects H0 when x < xc equals 1-b 
= .189.  Thus, as demonstrated previously, fixing the significance level at a	=	.05	results	
in	a	high	Type	II	error	rate	(b(xC) = .811). 
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FIGURE 14A – Null and Alternative Distribution H1c (N = 10) 
 
 
 
Increasing the critical value for rejection of the null hypothesis can increase the 
power of the test and lower the sum of the error rates. The LR(x*) = 1 test that minimizes 
a + b is the test that rejects H0 when x < x* = 4.43. The figure illustrates the effect on the 
Type I and Type II errors of moving from the a	=	.05	significance	level	cutoff	of	xC = 
2.40 to x* = 4.43.  The increase in	the	Type	I	error	rate	(Da	=	.309)	is	more	than	offset	
by	the	decrease	in	the	Type	II	error	rate	(Db = -.482).66   
 
However, because of the large overlap between the null and alternative 
distributions, any test—even the test LR(x*) = 1 that minimizes a + b—will have a high 
total error rate.  As a result, even the LR(x*) = 1 test that rejects H0 for values of x < x* = 
4.43 produces Type I and Type II error rates that are both over .3, and the total error rate 
is just under .7 (a(x*) + b(x*) = .688).67   
 
The properties of the normal approximations to the null and alternative sampling 
distributions when N = 100 are depicted in Figure 14B.  When N = 100, the means of the 
null and alternative sampling distributions are 2.5 standard deviations apart, reducing the 
overlap between the two distributions. As a result, the power associated with the fixed a 
																																																								
66 Because the null and alternative distributions have different standard deviations, the test that 
minimizes a + b will not equalize the Type I and Type II error rates. See Meyerson & Meyerson, 
supra note 36 at 840 (Advocating a test where a = b). See also Gelbach, supra note 32, who 
provides conditions sufficient for the result that when the likelihood ratio equals 1, α and β will 
be equal and less than 0.5 (the conditions include that the alternative hypothesis is specific, as 
considered in the present paper); these conditions rely on the monotone likelihood ratio property, 
which need not hold when the distributions under the null and alternative hypotheses have 
different variances. 
67 These error rates are based on the normal approximation, and thus differ slightly from the rates 
based on the binomial probabilities reported above.	
xc=2.40& x*=4.43&
α  = .05 
1-β = .189 
α=.359&
Δα = +.309 
1+β = .671 &
Δβ = -.482 
Min. α + β Test: Fixed α  = .05 Test: 
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= .05 test exceeds .8.  The Type I and Type II errors under the LR(x*) = 1 test are smaller, 
with both approximately equal to .10.68 
 
FIGURE 14B - Null and Alternative Distribution H1c (N = 100) 
 
 
 
 
Finally, Figure 14C shows the normal approximations to the null and alternative 
sampling distributions when N =1000.  The means of the distributions are over seven 
standard deviations apart, and overlap of the distributions is minute.  The fixed-a = .05 
NHST produces a test with near perfect power.  By design, this test still has α=0.05, so 
total error probability is always at least 0.05. By contrast, the LR(x*) = 1 test, which 
lowers the critical value form xC to x* only negligibly reduces power even as it reduces 
the Type I error rate from.05 nearly to zero. The result is a near-perfect test, with a and b 
both approximately equal to zero.		This	example	shows	that	when	sample	size	is	large,	
total	error	costs	can	be	reduced	below	what	the	fixed-α	test	delivers,	precisely	
because	such	a	test	fixes	α at a positive level.	
	
																																																								
68 The effect of increasing N can also be seen by examining the standardized test statistic Z 
discussed in note 60, supra.   For a binomial sampling distribution for counts, the normal test 
statistic is X	 = 	 P (DSD<)
D<(0S	D<)
. This expression shows that increasing N will increase Z for any 
given difference p – p0.  As a result, for large N, even small differences from the null probability 
p0 will be statistically significant at “standard” fixed levels of a (e.g., .05) 
xc=41.8& x*=43.71&
1-β = .813 
α=.104&
Δα = +.054 
1*β = .900 &
Δβ = -.087 
α  = .05 
Min. α + β Test: Fixed α  = .05 Test: 
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FIGURE 14C – Null and Alternative Distribution H1c (N = 1,000) 
 
 
 
D. Relationship of the Mathematical Representation of the Preponderance 
Standard to the Significance Level 
 
Under the preponderance standard, a court should find for the plaintiff when 
evidence supporting the plaintiffs’ case is more likely than the evidence that supports the 
defendant’s case.  Under the assumption of equal error costs, the standard of proof 
threshold from the preponderance standard is the LR(x*) = p test given in equation (10).   
 
The prior sections have established that the fixed-a = .05 NHST is generally not the 
same as the LR(x*) = p preponderance test.  This is true in general for any fixed-a NHST 
test. When a specific alternative is specified, it is not true that the preponderance standard 
requires a significance level a = .50.69  Based on a one-tailed test, such an a = .50 test 
would require that the null hypothesis be rejected when the outcome is below the mean of 
the null distribution or: 
 
µ0 = Np0, or , = 	 N % *+ Y% = 	# PQ+ = 	 .5
RD<
S[
    (15) 
 
 
																																																								
69 Cohen, supra note 6 at 415-6.  See also the text in note 5, supra (presenting examples of 
plaintiff’s experts arguing for use of a 50% significance level). 
x*=436.5& xc=473.99&
1-β ≈ 1 
α ≈ 0&
Δα = -.05 
1+β ≈ 1&
Δβ ≈ 0 
α  = .05 
Fixed α  = .05 Test: Min. α + β Test: 
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FIGURE 15 – Preponderance Standard and Fixed a Tests 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 depicts the non-equivalence of the preponderance standard and fixed-a 
NHST when N=100. From condition (15), the threshold for the fixed a = .50 null 
hypothesis is determined by the point where the null distribution function F(x|H0) 
intersects the horizontal line at .5.  This yields a critical value xC = µ0 = Np0 = 50.  In 
contrast, from (11), the threshold x* for the preponderance standard with diffuse priors 
requires that the trier of fact finds for the plaintiff when "C = ?(F|;=)
?(F|;<)
> "C(%∗) = 1.  
This condition holds when x < x*.  The preponderance standard threshold is determined 
by the point where the likelihood ratio LR intersects the horizontal line at 1.0.  This 
criterion yields a critical value x*= 43.71 < 50.  Thus. x* ¹ xC = µ0 = Np0.   
 
FIGURE 16 - Preponderance Standard and Fixed a Tests 
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To provide an alternative view of this point, Figure 16 depicts the critical thresholds 
from the fixed-a = .05 NHST, the LR(x*) = 1 test, and the fixed-a = .50 NHST based on 
normal approximations of the null and *0T distributions when N = 100.  As was 
demonstrated above when p	= 4 =1, the preponderance threshold is identical to the 
LR(x*) = 1 threshold, and will generally not coincide with the fixed a = .05 threshold.  
The latter may lie to the left or right of the former.  In Figure 16, the a = .05 threshold 
lies to the left of the LR* = 1 threshold.  For similar reasons, the preponderance threshold 
will not coincide with the a = .50 threshold either.70  Based on the normal approximation, 
this outcome can only occur if the null and alternative distributions are identical.  When 
they are not, as in the case depicted in Figure 16, the preponderance standard can never 
be the same as a fixed a = .50 null hypothesis test.71 Moreover, use of such a test would 
increase the total error cost rate a + b relative to the preponderance standard, raising the 
Type I error rate by .396 and reducing Type II error rates by .095. 
 
E. Preliminary versus Final Adjudication 
 
Finally, the analysis can be used to model other legal thresholds.  Much of the 
discussion of burdens of proof in the law and economics literature focus on the standard 
applicable to final adjudication.  However, as noted above, the same standards are 
sometimes applied to adjudicate preliminary issues, such as the burden of production for 
a prima facie case of discrimination examined above.  
 
For example, the analysis can be applied to the pleading standard applicable to 
scienter under the PSLRA, as interpreted by Tellabs.72  The Court in Tellabs describes 
this pleading standard in the following way:73 
 
In order to survive a motion to dismiss … a plaintiff must allege facts 
from which “a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter 
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could 
draw from the facts alleged.”  
 
Letting H1 denote the plaintiff’s hypothesis and H0 denote the defendant’s 
hypothesis, a natural interpretation of the Tellabs standard is that the likelihood ratio 
																																																								
70	Cohen, supra note 6 at 415-6, argues that the preponderance standard yields the same critical 
threshold as the a = .50 threshold.  Setting a = .50 results in a cutoff at the mean of the null 
distribution, which is consistent with rejecting the null hypothesis when the proportion of females 
hired p = x/N is less than .5, which Cohen equates with the absolute probability preponderance 
standard.  But this p = x/N < .5 is not the preponderance standard set out in equations (10) or 
(11).  
71	See Gelbach, supra note 32.	
72	Tellabs, supra note 46.	
73 Id. at 322 (discussing heightened pleading standard under PSLRA).	
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"C =
?(F|;=)
?(F|;<)
> "C(%@\]]^_`) = 1.  Mathematically, the application of our analytical 
framework to the Tellabs pleading standard would be identical to that used to evaluate the 
preponderance threshold with diffuse priors. 
 
 However, while the formal analysis is the same, the circumstances under which 
the critical likelihood ratio is applied will likely differ in a preliminary adjudication.  
Motions to dismiss occur prior to the exchange of information through discovery, and 
thus are likely to be characterized by sampling distributions with less precision, e.g., 
greater standard errors, than will be the case during a final adjudication post-discovery.   
 
To illustrate this point, consider again the discrimination example used 
throughout the paper.74  Suppose that at the time of the motion to dismiss, there is a 
limited number of relevant observations (e.g., N = 10) corresponding to the current round 
of hiring.  Discovery allows the consideration of data associated with prior hiring cycles, 
so that N > 10.  Under these circumstances, the preliminary adjudication will involve 
overlapping sampling distributions depicted in Figure 14A where N = 10, while final 
adjudication will involve the conditions depicted in Figures 14B and 14C where the 
sampling distribution are more precise and thus distinguishable because N is much larger 
than 10.  In terms of the significance level implied by the "C(%:a) = 1 critical threshold, 
application to a sampling distribution with N = 10 and relatively large standard errors will 
result in a much higher implied significance level than the application at summary 
judgment or final adjudication of the "C(%∗) = 1 threshold to sampling distributions with 
relatively low standard errors (e.g., where N = 100 or N = 1,000).75    
	
V. Conclusion	
 
Models of optimal legal decision rules often use loss functions that seek to 
minimize the sum of error costs and direct costs.  In theory, the choice of a statistical 
cutoff can reflect a similar calculus, but the standard practice under fixed-significance 
level NHST does not.  Thus, it is not surprising that use of fixed-a NHST will not 
correspond to existing or optimal legal decision rules.  This potential for divergence 
																																																								
74	To	be	sure,	the	pleading	standard	for	discrimination	cases	is	different	from	that	for	cases	
covered	by	the	PSLRA.		As	with	other	cases	for	which	there	is	no	statutory	pleading	
standard,	the	standard	for	discrimination	cases	is	set	forth	by	Rule	8(a)(2)	as	elaborated	by	
the	plausibility	standard	in	Twombly,	supra	note	44, and filtered through Iqbal’s application of 
Rule 1’s edict that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures govern all civil actions. The Supreme 
Court has insisted that the plausibility standard is not a probability standard, but many 
commentators, judges, and lawyers have suggested or acted as if it is difficult to understand how 
that could be so. This response is surely partly due to the Supreme Court’s use of language 
suggesting that the plaintiff has failed to plead plausibly when an alternative story is at least as 
compelling as the plaintiff’s. 	
75 The application of the "C∗ = 1 test at the MTD stage will result in high total error costs a + b, 
but such a test will likely be associated with relatively low costs C. 
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between NHST statistical cutoffs and legal decision rules can inform how to reconcile the 
tools of statistical inference to be consistent with the applicable legal standard.  Our 
analysis shows how reconciling the two can be achieved by replacing fixed significance 
levels with likelihood ratio tests.  
	
 
